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IS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY “INVESTMENT”?  ELI LILLY 
v. CANADA AND THE INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY SYSTEM 
RUTH L. OKEDIJI* 
INTRODUCTION 
On September 12, 2013, Eli Lilly filed a Notice of Arbitration 
against Canada under the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) arbitration provisions,1 commencing the first intellectual 
property investment dispute filed under NAFTA.  The dispute was 
instigated by court rulings invalidating two of Lilly’s pharmaceuti-
cal patents based on judicial interpretations of the utility require-
ments contained in the Canadian patent statute.  The so-called 
“promise of the patent doctrine” requires patent applications to 
support the claimed inventive promise made by the applicant to 
satisfy the utility requirement.  Lilly claims this standard is incon-
sistent with the utility standards of other NAFTA signatories and a 
departure from Canadian law at the time Lilly filed its patent ap-
plications.2  According to Lilly, the invalidation of the patents 
amounts to indirect expropriation of its intellectual property rights 
and contravenes the firm’s legitimate expectations about the treat-
ment of its investments.3  Lilly seeks $500 million in damages, but 
observers have noted that compensation is not Lilly’s ultimate 
goal; rather, the firm seeks to compel a change in Canadian patent 
law, an intervention by the Parliament to limit the interpretation of 
the utility requirement by judges.  Lilly’s chief patent counsel high-
lighted this ultimate goal stating, “[t]he Parliament could have 
stepped in and fixed Canada’s patent statutes, . . . [but] [t]o date 
                                                     
* William L. Prosser Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School.  
My appreciation goes to Bethany Mihalik for excellent research assistance, to the 
Symposium Chair Diepiriye Anga and my co-panelists at the University of Penn-
sylvania Journal of International Law Journal Symposium held on November 8, 
2013. 
1  Eli Lilly v. Can., UNCITRAL, Notice of Arbitration (Sept. 12, 2013), available 
at http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1582.pdf [here-
inafter Notice of Arbitration Against Canada]. 
2  Id. ¶ 9.  
3  Id. ¶ 4.  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
08_OKEDIJI (DO NOT DELETE) 10/14/2014  8:20 PM 
1122 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 35:4 
they have looked the other way.”4 
This case represents not only a new frontier in investment arbi-
tration, but more importantly, uncharted territory in the increas-
ingly complex and contested landscape of international intellectual 
property obligations.  Intellectual property has long ceased to be 
primarily a domestic concern; indeed, some argue that its chief 
significance lies in setting the terms and conditions of global com-
petition, including facilitating access to technology and public 
goods.  Incorporating intellectual property obligations in bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) was intended to provide stronger and 
more stable protection for firms in developed countries.  Instead, 
the confluence of intellectual property and foreign investment 
standards in a single legal framework foreshadows a landscape of 
varying and conflicting obligations for states whose regulatory 
powers are already under significant strain from expansive obliga-
tions flowing from a robust collection of transnational laws. 
The inclusion of intellectual property within the investment ar-
bitration realm threatens to turn intellectual property law on its 
head.  National innovation policy is one of the very few areas still 
largely insulated from the pervasive economic governance that 
conditions contemporary international economic relations.  Intel-
lectual property obligations in the investment context thus pose a 
new threat to states’ traditional lawmaking powers by providing 
foreign actors a singular opportunity to challenge laws that have 
been enacted with the domestic public interest in full view, even 
when they are  in conformity with international intellectual proper-
ty treaties.  Subverting a core judicial function—interpretation of a 
domestic law already infused with multilateral obligations—to the 
oversight of a private international tribunal precariously alters the 
contours of state power and responsibility for compliant domestic 
legislation and policy prescriptions.   
Lilly’s arguments amount to a claim that, in agreeing to an in-
vestment treaty, a government takes on an affirmative obligation to 
constrain the evolution of national legal standards, or to limit the 
public policy that fuels such evolution to the equilibrium that ex-
isted at the time the treaty was signed.  Such a backwards-looking 
approach suggests a rigidity not contemplated in the international 
                                                     
4  See Adam Behsudi, Eli Lilly Sues Canada on Drug Patents, POLITICO (Sept. 12, 
2013, 7:03 PM), available at http://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/eli-lilly-
sues-canada-over-drug-patents-96743.html (quoting Doug Norman, Eli Lilly’s 
chief patent counsel, in an interview with POLITICO).  
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intellectual property framework and that, uncurbed, would un-
dermine the capacity of intellectual property law and policy to re-
spond to dynamic shifts in the national or global technological 
frontier. 
In this essay, I briefly consider some implications for intellectu-
al property protection within the investment landscape in light of 
the Eli Lilly dispute.  Part I highlights the dense network of inter-
national intellectual property obligations, focusing on the policy 
considerations involved with incorporating intellectual property in 
the definition of “investment.”  Part II reviews the relationship be-
tween the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS 
Agreement) and investment treaties, emphasizing the relationship 
between multilateral intellectual property obligations and the do-
mestic policy context.  I argue that there is no substantive standard 
of utility in any international instrument with which Canada or 
any other country is required to conform,5 and that Lilly’s claim 
appears to confuse minimum standards with means of implemen-
tation.  Under the TRIPS Agreement and existing investor-state ar-
bitration precedent, Canada’s only obligation is to apply its law.  
Lilly’s arguments seek to undermine the TRIPS Agreement’s delib-
erately crafted “wiggle room,” freezing intellectual property policy 
and subordinating national welfare interests to the private expecta-
tions of a single foreign actor.  Moreover, the doctrine of reasona-
ble expectations upon which Lilly so heavily relies has already 
been debunked in the context of the TRIPS Agreement which, un-
der the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, should be 
deemed a superseding agreement between Canada and the United 
States. 
Finally, in Part III, I point to differences in intellectual property 
disputes in investment proceedings versus the TRIPS context and 
suggest approaches that could facilitate a less disruptive role for 
investor-state disputes involving intellectual property rights. On 
face value, Eli Lilly’s claims could effectively constitute a revision 
of NAFTA.6  If Lilly is successful in its grander objective—a ruling 
                                                     
5 Jerome H. Reichman, Securing Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement After US 
v. India, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 585, 585, 589 (1998) (noting the absence of strict harmo-
nization in the TRIPS Agreement).  
6  Methanex Corp. v. United States, UNCITRAL, Second Opinion of Professor 
Sir Robert Jennings, Q.C. (Sept. 6, 2001), available at 
http://italaw.com/cases/documents/1273.  Under NAFTA, parties can agree on 
a binding interpretation of a particular provision.  See, e.g., NAFTA Free Trade 
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that Canada is required to change its current utility standard—the 
implications for intellectual property multilateralism, and for intel-
lectual property policy in all countries, would be stunning indeed. 
1. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
LANDSCAPE 
Efforts to create an international framework regulating private 
investment began in the period after World War II in the context of 
European reconstruction efforts and the assimilation of former co-
lonial states into the world economy. Initial attempts to negotiate 
multilateral instruments failed, but provided the blueprints for bi-
lateral and regional investment treaties. European countries nego-
tiated the first wave of BITs, starting with a Germany–Pakistan BIT 
in 1959.  The demise of communism and abandonment of com-
mand economies ushered in a new period of investment treaty ne-
gotiation in the 1980s, as competition for capital inflows out-
weighed the desires of countries to strictly manage the terms of 
foreign direct investment. Over the past three decades, BITs and 
regional trade agreements have grown exponentially; today, it is 
estimated that there are more than 2750 regional and bilateral in-
vestment treaties in force, and cumulative totals of FDI around the 
globe is estimated at 1.35 to 1.45 trillion dollars annually.7 
Roughly during the same post-War period, multilateral intel-
lectual property treaty negotiations established minimum substan-
tive standards of protection in every major category of intellectual 
property, culminating in 1994 with the conclusion of the TRIPS 
Agreement.8  Although the definition of “investment” contained in 
most investment treaties mention intellectual property, the obliga-
tions, expectations, and enforcement aspects of these treaties are 
largely undeveloped.  Moreover, the doctrinal, policy, and struc-
tural differences between BITs and the TRIPS Agreement have 
rarely been meaningfully analyzed, leaving a gap in the interna-
tional law of intellectual property.  That is the gap Eli Lilly now 
seeks to exploit. 
                                                     
Comm’n, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions (July 31, 2001), 
available at 
http://www.sice.oas.org/tpd/nafta/Commission/CH11understanding_e.asp. 
7   U.N. CONF. ON TRADE AND DEV. (UNCTAD), WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 
2013 xii, xix (2013). 
8  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, An-
nex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
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1.1. Is Intellectual Property an Investment? 
Modern investment treaties typically define covered assets 
broadly.  Various agreements define an “investment” as an asset 
with “the characteristics of an investment, including such charac-
teristics as the commitment of capital or other resources, the expec-
tation of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk”;9 “real estate or 
other property, tangible or intangible”;10 or “any kind of assets and 
any contribution in cash, in kind or in services, invested or rein-
vested in any sector of economic activity.”11  Investment may also 
be defined by reference to an illustrative, but non-exhaustive list, 
which explicitly mentions intellectual property.12 
Many commentators have taken the inclusion of intellectual 
property within most “investment” definitions as given because of 
the importance of intellectual property to the modern information 
economy.  Intellectual property, however, differs considerably 
from most other covered investment assets in important respects.  
Intellectual property rights can be held simultaneously in many 
countries and in some cases, like copyright, without any formali-
ties or other domestic process that would indicate a specific in-
vestment purpose.  Is merely having authorial works in circulation 
in a host country sufficient to constitute an “investment in a given 
country?”  Similarly, where patent rights are acquired by mere reg-
istration, such as in many least-developed countries, should this 
alone confer the status of an “investment”?  Should requirements 
of local working conditions that more firmly anchor the patent 
grant to domestic priorities make a difference in an assessment of a 
protected investment? 
The multilateral intellectual property system has largely 
evolved around the administrative objective of facilitating ease of 
acquisition and enforcement of minimum rights in global markets.  
The prospect that this objective for intellectual property multilater-
                                                     
9  U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, § A, art. 1 (2012), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeti
ng.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Model BIT]. 
10  Agreement Between Japan and the United Mexican States for the 
Strengthening of the Economic Partnership, art. 96(i)(GG), Sept. 17, 2004, 
WT/REG198/1 (not yet in force). 
11  Agreement Between the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union and the 
Government of the Republic of India for the Promotion and the Protection of In-
vestments, art. 1(b), Oct. 31, 1997, 2136 U.N.T.S. 121, 124. 
12  See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 9, at § A, art. 1 (listing the forms that an in-
vestment can take and specifically including IP rights). 
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alism could now confer status as an “investment” is singularly 
problematic.  At a minimum, a determination that an intellectual 
property rights owner is also an investor cannot plausibly be based 
solely on acquiring rights, particularly since member states of the 
WTO have no choice but to accord such rights, and to do so on the 
terms set by the TRIPS Agreement. Moreover, all intellectual prop-
erty rights are to some extent contingent rights only; whether a 
claimant is a rightful owner, has complied with national eligibility 
standards for protection, whether there are any applicable subject-
matter limits or supervening policy considerations, or whether a 
granting agency has appropriately granted (or denied) such rights 
are always subject to question before national courts. To transform 
such contingent rights into property-like assets gives graver import 
than contemplated by States to the role of intellectual property 
treaties.      
1.2. Who is an Intellectual Property ‘Investor’? 
Whether intellectual property constitutes “investment” re-
quires granular analysis on a case-by-case basis.  A few considera-
tions should be important in such an exercise by an arbitration 
panel.  First, empirical evidence on the effect of intellectual proper-
ty protection for foreigners is mixed; certainly for developing and 
least-developed countries, uncritical protection of intellectual 
property rights can exact significant economic costs.  For example, 
rather than constituting an “investment” in the local economy as 
such, protection of foreign patent rights may serve primarily to 
preserve export markets for the patent owner, leading to welfare 
losses for the host country, including dislocating local industries, 
impeding local innovation, and increasing the costs of access to 
knowledge goods.  Further, host countries must invest significantly 
in enhancing the domestic legal and business environment to at-
tract sustainable levels of FDI.  Indeed, the competitive situation 
between firms in the host country and a foreign firm seeking to in-
vest in their must be such that protecting an import market is more 
profitable than selling or licensing intellectual property assets to 
the local firms.  Moreover, host countries typically must offer for-
eign investors additional incentives such as tax breaks and advan-
tageous regulatory environments in addition to macroeconomic 
variables such as low input prices, reliable infrastructure, and ac-
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss4/8
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cess to distribution networks.13  In short, what constitutes an “in-
vestment” safeguarded under an investment treaty should not be 
decided merely by the existence of the intellectual property grant; 
the real and dynamic costs to the host country must be part of the 
assessment. 
Second, intellectual property protection for foreign holders can 
actually limit the flow of resources and other investments to host 
countries, thus curtailing the benefits that ordinarily flow from 
traditional forms of foreign investment.  For example, increased 
market power that flows from the exercise of intellectual property 
rights may decrease competition in the host country or raise entry 
barriers for smaller, foreign firms.14  Such observations have long 
been the basis for resistance by developing countries to the interna-
tional intellectual property system, and in particular the internation-
al patent system. Simply put, one foreign firm’s intellectual proper-
ty “investment” may be another foreign firm’s reason for divesting 
from the same host country. No determination of intellectual prop-
erty as an “investment” is per se neutral; both domestic firms and 
other foreign firms will be affected by any resulting welfare loss. 
For example, foreign generic pharmaceutical companies that have 
invested in the Canadian market arguably have benefitted from the 
very utility doctrine Lilly is contesting.  If Canada changes its law 
to address Lilly’s demands, could those firms successfully claim 
that the new standard amounts to an indirect appropriation since it 
would alter the competitive equilibrium between them and Lilly? 
Any determination about the investment status of intellectual 
property requires careful consideration of how these rights are ac-
quired, used, and deployed in national markets.15  The outcome of 
such analyses will neither be straightforward nor necessarily con-
sistent in all cases and contexts.  This is not to say that intellectual 
                                                     
13  Carlos A. Primo Braga & Carsten Fink, The Relationship Between Intellectual 
Property Rights and Foreign Direct Investment, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 163, 170 
(1998). 
14  Id. at 172.  
15  See e.g., Constantine V. Vaitsos, The Revision of the International Patent Sys-
tem: Legal Considerations for a Third World Position, 4 WORLD DEV. 85, 85–99 (1976) 
(“Practically all patents granted in developing countries are never worked in their 
territories. . . .  [P]atent protection is not only divorced from innovative but also 
from investment activity, and can block the use of technology to directly work the 
patented processes or products.”).  See also PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, 
INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? 79–81 (2002) (ar-
guing that the international patent system did not bring benefits to developing 
countries, but rather harmed them). 
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property can never constitute foreign investment, but that it cannot 
automatically or easily be deemed as such. 
2. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OBLIGATIONS UNDER INVESTMENT 
TREATIES AND THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 
For all WTO member countries, domestic intellectual property 
laws are required to reflect the robust obligations of the TRIPS 
Agreement.  The TRIPS Agreement reflected a significant upgrade 
from prior multilateral arrangements in terms of its comprehensive 
scope and, notably, the opportunity to enforce the new rules. 
2.1. TRIPS’ Deference to National Frameworks 
Article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement requires every member 
country to establish utility or industrial application as a require-
ment for patentability, but neither TRIPS nor any other interna-
tional agreement specifies the substantive interpretation of the re-
quirement.16  The multilateral commitment to minimum standards 
and not harmonization is clear in TRIPS Art. 1.1, which states 
“[m]embers shall be free to determine the appropriate method of 
implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own 
legal system and practice.”17  Moreover, the WTO Agreement in-
corporates by reference The General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), which explicitly reserves to member states the right 
to apply measures “necessary to secure compliance with laws or 
regulations . . . not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agree-
ment, including . . . the protection of patents, trademarks and cop-
yrights . . . .”18  Further, the WTO Appellate Body confirmed in In-
dia–Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical 
Products that TRIPS obligations are limited only to the explicitly 
stated minimum standards, “legitimate expectations of Members 
and private rights holders” to the contrary.  According to the Ap-
                                                     
16  Jerome H. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition 
Under the TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 11, 26 (1996) (analyzing the 
lack of harmonization in crucial doctrinal issues in all areas of IP rights); E. Rich-
ard Gold & Michael Shortt, The Promise of the Patent in Canada and Around the 
World, 30 CAN.  INTELL. PROP. REV. (forthcoming June 2014). 
17  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8.  
18  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, THE LEGAL 
TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE 
NEGOTIATIONS 17 (1999), 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994) (incorporating by 
reference The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1947). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss4/8
08_OKEDIJI (DO NOT DELETE) 10/14/2014  8:20 PM 
2014]      IS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY “INVESTMENT”?      1129 
pellate Body, “the legitimate expectations of the parties to a treaty 
are reflected in the language of the treaty itself.”19 
Investment treaties, however, have been widely interpreted to 
require deference to (and compliance with) the legitimate expecta-
tions of the investor as part of the “fair and equitable treatment” 
clauses contained in most BITs and regional investment agree-
ments.20  Arbitration panels have not generally interpreted legiti-
mate expectations to allow investors to freeze legislative or regula-
tory frameworks,21 but the doctrine has been used to limit the 
policy choices available to countries.22  Nonetheless, the unique 
role of intellectual property in national public policy, its im-
portance to innovation and global competition, and the overlap-
ping network of intellectual property treaties that restate the same 
basic obligations (often using the same language in the TRIPS 
Agreement) make it highly questionable that a doctrine of legiti-
mate expectations should dominate the construction of NAFTA’s 
intellectual property provisions, as Lilly suggests. 
There are good reasons it should not.  First, the repetition of in-
tellectual property standards in multiple bilateral, investment, and 
multilateral treaties were not meant to change the substantive 
meaning of these obligations under domestic law, but rather to en-
trench accepted criteria in the fabric of international economic rela-
tions.  Accordingly, an interpretation of NAFTA’s provisions must 
take place in the broader context of this network of treaties. 
Second, some investment treaties contain asymmetric provi-
sions in which investor-state dispute provisions accord different 
treatment to investors from one treaty partner than what applies to 
investors from another treaty partner in similar circumstances.23  A 
recent OECD survey shows there are more than 1,200 different in-
                                                     
19   Appellate Body Report, India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Ag-
ricultural Chemical Products, ¶¶ 13, 48, WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997) [hereinaf-
ter India—Patents]. 
20  Michele Potestà, Legitimate Expectations in Investment Treaty Law: Under-
standing the Roots and the Limits of a Controversial Concept, 28 ICSID REV. 88, 91 
(2013). 
21  See id. at 98–121 (defining the contours of the legitimate expectations doc-
trine). 
22  See id. at 116 (discussing the results of the Total v. Argentine Republic arbi-
tration, in which the Tribunal found that Argentina’s gas pricing scheme violated 
the investor’s legitimate expectations) (internal citations omitted).  
23  See, e.g., Convention on the Protection of Investments, Fr.-Tunis., June 30, 
1972, 848 U.N.T.S. 144; Convention on the Protection of Investments, Fr.-Serb., 
Mar. 28, 1974, 974 U.N.T.S. 110.  
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vestor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) clauses in about 1,500 trea-
ties, raising important challenges to the harmonization of invest-
ment law, consistency in arbitral awards,24 and equal treatment of 
all investors.  While the survey only found limited instances of 
such disparate treatment, it is likely that there are much larger in-
stances of de facto discrimination between investors.  For example, 
if successful, Lilly’s claimed interpretation of the utility standard 
would apply to investors from NAFTA countries, but not to other 
foreigners filing for patents in Canada.25  Arguably, Canada may 
even exclude Canadians from enjoying the lower utility threshold 
advanced by Lilly.  Such disparate treatment of inventors and the 
resulting unevenness in international intellectual property protec-
tion is largely part of what the TRIPS Agreement was intended to 
correct.26 
2.2. Dispute Settlement in the WTO and Investment Treaties 
Procedural and substantive differences between dispute set-
tlement under investment treaties and the WTO have particular 
significance for the construction of states’ intellectual property ob-
ligations.  The WTO procedures are a public law process:  only 
state-to-state disputes are contemplated, panels produce published 
opinions, and third-party participation is possible, allowing coun-
tries to develop coalitions around aggregated interests.27  Invest-
ment treaties, on the other hand, may include ISDS clauses that al-
low investors to invoke compulsory arbitration.  The ability of a 
foreign, private investor to seek redress against a sovereign state is 
unique to the international investment realm.  Investors may bring 
claims autonomously, without regard to the interests, concerns, or 
support of their source countries.  Investors may also bring claims 
and receive settlements in entirely confidential proceedings. 
                                                     
24  Joachim Pohl, Kekeletso Mashigo & Alexis Nohen, Dispute Settlement Pro-
visions in International Investment Agreements: A Large Sample Survey, (OECD In-
vestment Division, OECD Working Paper on International Investment, No. 
2012/2, 2012), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/investment/workingpapers. 
25  There is a related, important question of whether Canada could legally of-
fer one utility standard for other NAFTA members and another for Canadians, in 
other words, a “reverse” national treatment rule in which the host country’s citi-
zens are treated worse than foreign applicants.   
26  See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at pmbl., arts. 1–4 (emphasizing that 
the agreement is intended to “reduce distortions . . . to international trade”). 
27  Peter Drahos, Weaving Webs of Influence: The United States, Free Trade 
Agreements and Dispute Resolution, 41 J. WORLD TRADE 191, 201 (2007). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss4/8
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As a general matter, WTO panels determine the scope of inter-
national obligations by applying systemic tools of treaty interpreta-
tion, including consideration of other public international law re-
gimes and even local conditions.28  The Appellate Body has 
insisted that WTO Panels must have regard to the broader frame-
work of international law, although Panels do not always adopt 
the same approach to the issue of coherence between legal regimes.  
A discernible culture of referencing the Vienna Convention rules is 
evident in modern investment arbitration decisions, but this trend 
has yet to yield a generally prevailing theory of interpretation in 
Tribunal awards, though important principles of interpretation can 
be gleaned.29  Importantly, it is far less likely that a strong argu-
ment can be made for an interpretative approach by investment 
Tribunals that compels coherence with norms in other legal re-
gimes.30This is particularly so for investor-state disputes which are 
often based on a set of facts particular to a single economic transac-
tion or rights explicitly provided for individual investors.31  Of 
course, the fact that Parties to an investment treaty can choose 
what interpretations of terms will bind them32 may also limit the 
role of other international law rules of treaty interpretation.  This 
freedom to choose may insulate contracting Parties from compet-
ing values, arguably including those in international treaties to 
                                                     
28  For example, see Panel Report, China—Measures Affecting the Protection and 
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009) (consider-
ing local conditions of the Chinese copyright economy, criminal enforcement pri-
orities in China, and language in FTAs to determine compliance with TRIPS min-
imum standards obligations).   
29  Ian A. Laird, Interpretation in International Investment Arbitration –Through 
the Looking Glass, in A LIBER AMICORUM: THOMAS WÄLDE - LAW BEYOND 
CONVENTIONAL THOUGHT 151 (Jacques Werner & Arif Hyder Ali eds., 2009).  
30  See, e.g., RosInvestCo. U.K. Ltd. v. Russ. Fed’n, SCC Case No. V079/2005, 
Award on Jurisdiction (Oct. 5, 2007) (holding that Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna 
Convention applies only in “reference to rules of international law that condition 
the performance of the specific rights and obligations stipulated in the treaty . . .”, 
and thus declining the salience of human rights treaties raised by the claimant).   
31  Laird, supra note 28, at 157 (noting the “constant pressure that exists in in-
vestor-state arbitration between the fundamentally state-based system” and rights 
of individual investors under investment treaties).  
32  See, e.g., Economic Partnership and Cooperation Agreement Between the 
European Community and its Member States, of the One Part, and the United 
Mexican States, of the Other Part, art. 12, Dec. 8, 1997, 2000 O.J. (L 276) (maintain-
ing that the Joint Council is charged with establishing measures to protect IP 
rights, as well as choosing the appropriate mechanism to resolve disputes and en-
force these rights).   
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which only one of the Parties to the investment treaty is bound.33   
Finally, it is clear that ISDS provisions are meant to facilitate 
challenge to government policies that harm a single investor even if 
they advance the domestic public interest, or for that matter, pro-
vide a benefit to other foreign investors.  Today, these provisions 
have become increasingly controversial, with Germany recently 
withdrawing formal support for such a provision in the Transat-
lantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement.34 
3. CONSTRUCTING A POTENTIAL ROLE FOR INVESTOR-STATE 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DISPUTES 
Like all treaties, intellectual property agreements include delib-
erate gaps, reflecting areas of non-convergence and the residual 
sovereignty of states to legislate specific rules.  Indeed, because in-
tellectual property rights are intimately connected with how coun-
tries achieve a competitive equilibrium in their local economies, 
and how they promote innovation and assure a “pro-competitive 
balance of private and public interests,”35 it is well-recognized that 
domestic implementation of international intellectual property 
standards will take distinctive twists across countries.36  Rather 
than define every standard, fill every normative hole, or seek uni-
form rules, international intellectual property agreements merely 
create global competitive conditions between countries—not within 
them.  This domestic flexibility, key to both the theoretical justifica-
tions and the pragmatic, welfare-conscious administration of intel-
                                                     
33  See, e.g., Kardassopoulos v. Georgia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/18, Decision 
on Jurisdiction ¶ 215 (July 6, 2007) (concluding that there is some uncertainty 
whether the provisional application of the Energy Charter Treaty by one party 
constituted a rule of international law applicable under the BIT) . 
34  Shawn Donnan & Stefan Wagstyl, Transatlantic Trade Talks Hit German 
Snag, FINANCIAL TIMES (Mar. 14, 2014, 9:00 PM), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/cc5c4860-ab9d-11e3-90af-
00144feab7de.html#axzz2wjXAx4r9. 
35  Reichman, supra note 5, at 588.  
36  Michael P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 
687, 691–92 (1998)  
(“[T]he [Supreme] Court has consistently refused to view a treaty as a 
body of integrated norms . . . capable of generating internal solutions for 
gaps in its provisions.  Instead, when faced with an unsettled question 
under a treaty, the common approach has been to retreat to otherwise-
applicable domestic law, ‘whatever may be the imperfections or difficul-
ties’ this may leave in the fulfillment of the international law project.”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
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lectual property laws, is endangered by Lilly’s claims under 
NAFTA. 
3.1. Legitimate Expectations and Domestic Solicitude 
 Intellectual property rights are fundamentally directed at the 
public good.37  Each sovereign nation may evaluate the intellectual 
property bargain differently, defining rights, limitations, and ex-
ceptions in ways that address its particular domestic welfare calcu-
lus.  The conception of intellectual property as a tool to advance 
national welfare has long been part of multilateral intellectual 
property relations.38  The basis for determining the “legitimate ex-
pectations” of an intellectual property “investment” thus must res-
onate in domestic law. 
Intellectual property assets protected by various investment 
agreements, however, are not always defined solely by reference to 
domestic law.  Unless expressly restricted to the definitions con-
tained in domestic law, the scope of intellectual property rights in 
an investment agreement may be subjugated to notions of sym-
metry and international harmonization.39  For example, in Saipem 
S.p.A. v. Bangladesh,40 Bangladesh argued that because certain intel-
lectual property rights did not exist under Bangladeshi law, they 
could not fall within the definition of “investment” in its BIT with 
Italy.  The tribunal, however, rejected this argument, holding that 
“Bangladesh’s approach . . . would lead to a different interpreta-
tion and thus a different scope of protection under the BIT depend-
ing on the country in which the investment is made.”41  Under the 
tribunal’s reasoning, the scope of protection of a BIT must be 
                                                     
37  Brook K. Baker, Corporate Power Unbound: Investor-State Arbitration of IP 
Monopolies on Medicines – Eli Lilly and the TPP 1, 23 (PIJIP Research Paper Series, 
Paper No. 36, May 17, 2013), available at 
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/research/36. 
38 See Ruth L. Okediji, Public Welfare and the International Patent System, in 
PATENT LAW IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 1 (Ruth L. Okediji & Margo A. Bagley eds., 
2014) (observing that IP rights have historically been used to “improve the welfare 
of citizens at home.”) (internal citations omitted).  
39 Tania S. Voon, Andrew D. Mitchell & James Munro, Intellectual Property 
Rights in International Investment Agreements: Striving for Coherence in National and 
International Law, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AFTER THE CRISIS: A TALE OF 
FRAGMENTED DISCIPLINES 7 (C.L. Lim & Bryan Mercurio eds., forthcoming 2014), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2318955. 
40  Saipem S.p.A. v. People’s Republic of Bangl., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07, 
Decision on Jurisdiction (Mar. 21, 2007). 
41  Id. ¶ 124. 
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symmetrical for parties to the treaty, and therefore an investor may 
be able to claim an intellectual property right that the host state 
does not recognize. 
Even under a strict reading of the tribunal’s reasoning in Sai-
pem, Eli Lilly would still be advancing a weak claim; the United 
States and Canada are party to the same intellectual property 
agreements, and Lilly was not denied protection for any category 
of intellectual property.  Lilly challenges the interpretation of pa-
tentability requirements and objects to the departure from an al-
leged regionally harmonized utility standard.  Lilly imports this 
standard from U.S. law, the TRIPS Agreement, and the Patent Co-
operation Treaty, arguing that its profit expectations derive from 
the representations in those agreements.  Yet, these agreements ex-
plicitly reserve the ability to interpret patentability standards, like 
utility, to individual countries.  As discussed above, multilateral 
intellectual property treaties do not provide or mandate any sub-
stantive interpretation of utility or any other patentability require-
ment.  NAFTA also does not impose a substantive standard of util-
ity; in fact, the only mention of the utility standard in the entire 
intellectual property chapter is semantic—Art. 1709 provides that 
“capable of industrial application” is synonymous with “useful,” 
parroting the language of the TRIPS Agreement. 
Ironically, Lilly’s reliance on the alleged stable, “low” standard 
of utility embraced by U.S. courts is misplaced, and its citation to 
the In re Brana decision is misleading.42  In re Brana is one of a line 
of cases defining the contours of the U.S. utility standard; the juris-
prudence is viewed by some commentators as internally incon-
sistent and technology specific.43  As leading scholars have noted, 
patentability standards, like the utility standard at issue in the Lilly 
case, are fundamentally policy levers.44  These standards vary by 
country precisely because they are used to implement specific pa-
tent policy goals.  Often, countries calibrate across patentability 
standards to achieve net policy goals in specific sectors.  The ulti-
mate question is whether the inventor has provided enough in ex-
change for the patent grant.  It is the responsibility and prerogative 
                                                     
42  Notice of Arbitration Against Canada, supra note 1, ¶ 31. 
43  In re Brana failed to address the earlier Brenner v. Manson case which dealt 
with the exact same technology, steroid chemistry, and which arguably set a high-
er utility standard.  In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Brenner v. Manson, 
383 U.S. 519 (1966).  
44  Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 
1575, 1644–46 (2003). 
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of each country to answer this question within its domestic legal 
system and practice.  And, as the TRIPS Agreement makes clear, 
the interpretation of multilateral intellectual property standards 
must necessarily “tak[e] into account differences in national legal 
systems.”45 
Finally, Lilly’s claims conflict with generally accepted interpre-
tations of the legitimate expectations doctrine before investment 
tribunals:  only in rare scenarios have changes in regulatory 
frameworks through the normal operation of domestic legal pro-
cess been held to violate “legitimate expectations.”46  In Continental 
Casualty v. Argentine Republic, the Tribunal held: 
 
it would be unconscionable for a country to promise not to 
change its legislation as time and needs change, or even 
more to tie its hands by such a kind of stipulation in case a 
crisis of any type or origin arose.  Such an implication as to 
stability . . . would be contrary to an effective interpretation 
of the Treaty; reliance on such an implication by a foreign 
investor would be misplaced and, indeed, unreasonable.47 
As an investor, Lilly is obligated to not only accept Canadian 
patent law as it stood at the time it filed the patent applications, 
but to anticipate that Canadian courts, like its U.S. counterparts, 
will apply patentability standards consistent with national law and 
policy. 
3.2. Conflicting or Consistent Obligations? 
Investment treaty standards may operate in tension with the 
pragmatic administration of intellectual property protection in 
several ways.  Tribunal decisions may force countries to import 
standards that reflect insufficient links to relevant domestic poli-
cies crucial to a country’s innovation framework.  Tribunal-driven 
interpretations may also unravel the ideal of a consistent frame-
work for international intellectual property regulation, introducing 
                                                     
45  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at pmbl., ¶ C. 
46  See Potestà, supra note 20, at 111 (highlighting the decision in Total v. Ar-
gentine Republic, where the Tribunal held that “‘only exceptionally has the con-
cept of legitimate expectations been the basis of redress when legislative actions 
by a state was at stake’”) (internal citations omitted). 
47  Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Certi-
fied Award, ¶ 258 (Aug. 27, 2008). 
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one set of rules for multinationals and another set of rules for other 
inventors, creators and owners.  Overall, standards for states that 
are party to investment treaties could be different than those that 
apply to non-member states, thus disrupting the minimum interna-
tional baseline upon which the global community has come to rely. 
In reality, the intellectual property provisions of NAFTA were 
negotiated in full view of the TRIPS Agreement and in line with 
the expected outcome of the Uruguay Round.  The patent provi-
sions in the TRIPS Agreement significantly upgraded the Paris 
Convention, but without changing the standards required of mem-
ber states.  Instead, TRIPS reinforced basic requirements of patent-
ability and preserved flexibility for Member States to apply them 
within their own legal system.   
The decision of the Canadian court is a decision consistent with 
Canada’s obligations under TRIPS and thus must be deemed con-
sistent under NAFTA.  It simply cannot be the case that intellectual 
property obligations mean one thing under investment treaties and 
a completely different thing under trade agreements.  In the long 
term, rigid constraints on a state’s ability to advance its priorities in 
areas as crucial as innovation, access to knowledge goods, and oth-
er inputs basic to economic growth and development may lead to 
an unraveling of investment treaties, as suggested already by the 
actions of countries such as Indonesia and South Africa.48 
3.3. Rethinking Investor-State Intellectual Property Dispute 
Settlement 
Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions can some-
times be used as an opportunity for private firms to extract more 
from host countries than their governments were able to extract 
during the negotiating process.  The political bargains that make a 
treaty acceptable to the popular will in member states can be sub-
stantially unraveled by a single investor whose interests are unlike-
ly to reflect the full policy bargain reflected in the treaty.  The Lilly 
complaint illustrates the dangers of treating intellectual property as 
“investment” per se, isolated from its appropriate policy domains.  
                                                     
48  Ben Bland & Shawn Donnan, Indonesia to Terminate More than 60 Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, FINANCIAL TIMES (Mar. 26, 2014, 3:20 PM), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3755c1b2-b4e2-11e3-af92-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2yv00FuS5; South Africa Begins Withdrawing from EU-
Member BITs, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Oct. 30, 2012), available 
at http://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/10/30/news-in-brief-9/.  
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Lilly’s claims should have no legitimate resonance in light of an in-
ternational intellectual property system in which technological de-
velopments require agility, adaptation, and alignment of compet-
ing interests by governments seeking to advance innovation and 
the public welfare.  Despite these challenges related to the use of 
ISDS to address the intellectual property policies of states party to 
an investment treaty, there could be a role for such provisions.  I 
briefly offer four approaches: 
1. A Narrowly Tailored ISDS Provision:  A narrowly tailored  
ISDS provision  could be useful for  situations where a host coun-
try specifically targets the intellectual property right of a particular 
investor.  An example may be the issuance of a compulsory license 
without complying with the domestic process established to pro-
vide legal certainty for an investor pursuant to TRIPS. Because this 
type of dispute targets a particular action, rather than the interpre-
tation of an intellectual property standard, the policy-making abil-
ity of the host state is not threatened, and the dispute would not 
undo the TRIPS balance or compel potentially inconsistent norma-
tive outcomes across countries. 
2. An Institutional Approach:  Another approach is to provide a 
form of appellate review for investor-state disputes involving intel-
lectual property, such as the type that exists in the WTO system or 
in national law.   Given the  carefully crafted policy values built in-
to national and multilateral intellectual property systems, such a 
review could be an important vehicle for adjusting outcomes that 
unreasonably undermine the competitive equilibrium between 
rights holders and second comers that  often are at the heart of in-
tellectual property disputes.  Ideally, the review process would in-
corporate the hallmarks of a public law process:  published deci-
sions, the ability for third-party input and comment, and the 
involvement of other affected states or international institutions. 
3. An Investment Test:  A third approach is to require a com-
plainant to establish that its intellectual property rights have had a 
clear economic benefit to the host country and thus constitutes an 
“investment.”  One key factor in such an “investment test” could 
be requiring the claimant to establish the significance of the intel-
lectual property to the host State’s economic development.49 
                                                     
49  See Emmanuel Gaillard, Identify or Define? Reflections on the Evolution of the 
Concept of Investment in ICSID Practice, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 
21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER 404 (2009) (delineating 
the four elements of the Salini test for defining the term investment: (1) “contribu-
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4. A Holistic International Approach:  Finally, tribunals could be 
required to consider and address the construction of intellectual 
property standards in relation to the network of legal regimes that 
bear upon innovation policy and the welfare objectives of the intel-
lectual property system.  This could include competition policy or 
human rights considerations.  The point simply is to facilitate arbi-
tration outcomes that take into account the competing welfare 
claims of owners, users, and the public interest as reflected in 
complementary fields of law. 
CONCLUSION 
 The Eli Lilly complaint illustrates the dangers of treating intel-
lectual property as “investment” per se, and offers an opportunity 
to reconcile intellectual property protection in BITS with the TRIPS 
Agreement. By leveraging investor-state dispute provisions, the 
political bargains that make an investment treaty acceptable to 
States may be unraveled by a single investor whose interests will 
not reflect the range of policy tradeoffs animating the treaty. The 
fact is, as evidenced by Canada’s contested utility standard, the ar-
chitecture of the multilateral intellectual property system purpose-
fully accommodates some disharmony to facilitate national welfare 
objectives. As such, countries still have legal room to work within 
national constitutional prerogatives and policies affecting innova-
tion to implement the rights prescribed in intellectual property 
treaties even in the face of ever-increasing transnational obliga-
tions.  The role of national intellectual property regimes in estab-
lishing a globally competitive market place is vital to the public 
policy goals that undergird a progressive vision of public welfare 
in an integrated world economy; the peculiarities of investment 
treaties should not be leveraged to override this longstanding vir-
tue of the international intellectual property framework. 
 
                                                     
tions,” (2) “duration of performance of the contract,” (3) “participation in the risks 
of the transaction,” and (4) “contribution to the economic development of the host 
State”). 
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